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In one of the most influential papers in the theory of commercial policy, Bhagwati 
(1958a, 1958b) demonstrated formally the possibility of immiserizing growth: An 
open economy experiencing an expansion in its productive capacity (caused by 
economic growth or/and technological progress) can become worse off if its terms of 
trade deteriorate sufficiently and offset the beneficial effects of economic growth. 
This path-breaking example set up the stage for the development of the generalized 
theory of distortions and welfare which constitutes the analytical framework for the 
modern theory of commercial policy:  Johnson (1967) produced another example of 
immiserizing growth according to which a small open economy facing an 
exogenously imposed tariff could become worse off as a result of economic 
expansion; Bhagwati (1968, 1971)  related formally the three fundamental theoretical 
ingredients of commercial-policy theory: welfare, distortions and growth.  To put it 
loosely, his analysis established that in the presence of economic distortions, 
economic growth might cause deterioration in the level of social welfare.  
The purpose of the present note is not to highlight the significance of this 
fundamental insight, which is an elegant application of the theory of second best and 
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can be readily viewed as the equivalent of the “unification theory” in the field of 
Physics. This has been described very elegantly by Srinivasan (1996). The purpose of 
this note is to describe how the new growth theory can readily established cases of  
immiserizing endogenous growth.  
  
2. How is Growth Modeled? 
Typical studies of immiserizing growth utilizes the standard two-by-two static 
analytical framework and treats economic growth as an exogenous increase in the 
economy’s productive capacity measured by an expansion in the production 
possibility frontier.  Viewed from the lenses of formal neoclassical growth theory 
(which was the dominant one on these days), this treatment of economic growth is 
consistent with two possible interpretations: First, the analyst has in mind a 
comparison of steady-states of a growing economy where the initial equilibrium 
refers to a per-capita production possibility frontier and the final equilibrium 
corresponds to a higher per-capita growth steady-state (caused by an acceleration in 
the rate of technological progress);  Second, the researcher might have in mind 
steady-state level effects of a growing neoclassical economy which are associated 
with transitional per capita growth. For instance, a decline in the subjective discount 
rate or in the rate of population growth generates a higher steady-state capital labor 
ratio and transitional changes in the rate of economic growth. 
 In either case, if one were to cast the analysis of immiserizing growth 
within the neoclassical growth-theoretic framework, then the analysis would have to 
consider the effects of distortions during the transitional path from the initial  to the 
final steady-state equilibrium.  A branch of literature addressed this issue by 
analyzing the possibility of immizerizing neoclassical growth. More specifically, 
during the 1970’s several researchers addressed the question of deadweight loss 
caused by a move from autarky to free trade in growing economies (see Deardorff 
(1973), Smith (1976), and Samuelson (1975) among others). These studies 
demonstrated that a move from autarky to free trade could lower permanently the per-
capita steady state consumption expenditure, in the presence of a fixed savings ratio.  
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This result is consistent with the generalized theory of distortions and welfare, 
because the assumption of a fixed savings ratio can be interpreted as being equivalent 
to a domestic distortion. Starting from this conjecture, Srinivasan and Bhagwati 
(1980) demonstrated that removing this domestic distortion, by assuming that the 
savings rate is optimally determined and taking into account the welfare gains during 
the transition, a move from autarky to free trade is intertemporary efficient.  
Despite this novel finding, once could readily see the analytical difficulties in 
applying the theory of distortions and welfare to the dynamic framework of the 
neoclassical growth model: The existence of transitional dynamics coupled with 
exogenous per-capita long- run growth constituted two barriers for the development a 
dynamic theory of distortions, growth and welfare. The former makes any corrective 
policy time dependent and therefore difficult to implement; and the second does not 
leave a lot of room for the presence of distortions and no room at all for policies to 
affect welfare by changing the level of long-run growth.  The development of 
endogenous growth theory in the early 1990s removed, at least partially, these two 
barriers and highlighted several new links between the existence of endogenous 
distortions, long-run growth and intertemporal efficiency.  
 
3. Immiserizing  Endogenous Growth 
The development of the new growth theory placed the presence of externalities 
and economic distortions at the heart of long-run economic growth. This section use 
the insights of Schumpeterian growth theory which concentrates on the analysis of a 
particular type of economic growth, namely growth based on the endogenous 
introduction of new products and/or processes. The endogenous generation of new 
innovations is governed by the process of creative destruction described by Joseph 
Schumpeter (1942).  The presence of endogenous distortions, associated with 
temporary monopoly power and positive economic profits, creates strong incentives 
for firms to engage in R&D investments in order to discover new products and/or 
processes. And assuming that the economy is populated with profit-maximizing 
single-product firms, economic profits generated by temporary monopoly power are 
necessary to finance the upfront costs of  R&D investments. In other words, the 
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presence of economic externalities and endogenous distortions (associated with 
imperfect competition) are necessary for the existence of endogenous long-run 
growth.  Romer (1990) has elaborated on the role of non-convexities and imperfect 
competition in the generation of long-run endogenous Schumpeterian growth. 
We are now ready to describe how the new growth theory can readily generate 
cases of immiserizing growth. For that purpose, we will use the quality-ladders model 
of endogenous growth developed by Grossman and Helpman (1991a, 1991b chapter 
4). Similar considerations apply to endogenous growth models based on expanding 
product variety developed by Grossman and Helpman (1991b, chapter 3).  Consider 
then a global economy consisting of a continuum of structurally identical industries 
producing final consumption goods. The quality of each product can be improved 
through endogenous innovations. Each innovation is the outcome of a stochastic 
R&D race and the arrival of innovations in each industry is governed by a stochastic 
Poisson process whose intensity is denoted by I and is identical to the level of R&D 
services utilized by profit-maximizing firms in a particular industry.  Under the 
assumption that the continuum of industries is of measure one, the industry- wide 
level of R&D investment is equal to the economy- wide level of R&D investment.  
Labor is the only factor of production and one worker produces one unit of output 
or α  units of R&D services. Following the standard practice we use labor as the 
model’s numeraire and set up the wage equal to unity.  The winner of each R&D race 
becomes the sole producer of the state-of-art quality product in each industry and 
enjoys global temporary monopoly profits for a random time interval until further 
innovation occurs in that particular industry.  Furthermore, assume that the global 
economy consists of two structurally identical countries to simplify the analysis and 
exposition.  
Even if the productivity of labor does not differ across the two countries, at each 
instant of time half of the industries are populated by firms that discovered the state-
of-the-art products in one country and the rest are populated by monopolists located 
in the other country. Therefore, there is a lot of innovation-based trade in this global 
economy.  Moreover, the assumption of a continuum of industries eliminates the 
presence of aggregate uncertainty. And because firms choose the level of R&D 
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services and consumers choose the level of consumption expenditure, the economy 
does not have transitional dynamics.  
It turns out that the steady-state equilibrium of this Schumpeterian global 
economy is characterized by the following equations:  The long-run growth of a 
quality-weighted consumption index (i.e., the growth rate of total factor productivity) 
is endogenous and given by 
   lng I λ=       (1.1)   
where I is the steady-state level of industry and economy-wide R&D services and 
equals the rate of innovations (the intensity of the Poisson process that governs the 
arrival of  innovations; and 1λ >  is the magnitude of quality increment generated by 
an innovation (i.e., the magnitude to each innovation).  Any policy-related parameter 
change that affects the allocation of labor between manufacturing and R&D services 
has an impact on long-run Schumpeterian growth.  
 In the absence of aggregate uncertainty and transitional dynamics, the aggregate 
discounted welfare of this global economy -which is proportional to per-capita 
welfare- is given by 
    1 ln gU Cρ ρ
⎛= +⎜⎝ ⎠
⎞⎟      (1.2) 
where  C is the industry (or economy)-wide global quantity consumed; and 0ρ >  is 
the subjective discount rate, which is equal to the steady-state market interest rate.  
Equation (1.2) states that global welfare is an increasing concave function of 
aggregate consumption and the discounted rate of long-run growth.  Two more 
equations define the steady-state market values of global R&D services I and global 
aggregate consumption level : C
    
ln
g C Lα λ + = ,     (1.3) 








.      (1.4) 
Equation (1.3) is the full-employment of labor (resource) condition and states that the 
demand for labor engaged in R&D ( / / lnI gα α λ= ) plus the demand for labor in 
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manufacturing of final consumption goods (C) must equal the global supply of labor  
(L).  Equation (1.4) is the R&D condition and states that the expected discounted 
profits associated with R&D in each industry must be equal to zero; that is, the flow 
of monopoly profits [ ( 1)Cλ − )] of a winner of an R&D race discounted by the market 
interest rate ( ρ ) plus the probability of default due to further innovation ( / lnI g λ= ) 
must equal to the unit cost of R&D services (1/α ). 
 Equations (1.3) and (1.4) provide the following closed-form solutions for the 
long-run market values of long-run growth and aggregate consumption: 
   [ln( , , , ) ( 1)g L L ]λα λ ρ α λ ρλ
+ + + − = − −     (1.5) 
   1( , , , )C L L ρα λ ρ λ α
− + − + ⎡ ⎤= +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦        (1.6) 
The sign above each parameter on the left-hand-side in the above two equations 
indicates the direction of comparative statics exercises. Substituting the steady-state 
value of aggregate consumption from the resource condition (1.3) into the expression 
of welfare in (1.2) yields the following expression for the discounted welfare: 
   1 ln( )
ln
g gU Lρ α λ ρ
⎡ ⎤= − +⎢⎣ ⎦⎥
0
.     (1.7) 
The socially optimal level of long-run Schumpeterian growth maximizes equation 
(1.7) (i.e., is the solution to ) and is given by /U g∂ ∂ =
   lnmg Lα λ ρ= − .      (1.8) 
The socially-optimum long-run Schumpeterian growth is an increasing function of the 
productivity of labor in R&D services, the global endowment of labor and the size of 
innovations. It is also a declining function of the subjective discount rate.  
 It is well known that the presence of distortions creates a deviation between the 
socially-optimum and the market-equilibrium rate of innovation and long-run growth 
in quality ladder models of economic growth.  The presence of monopoly power 
which is necessary to finance the R&D investment and to pay the wage bill of R&D 
researchers prior to manufacturing of newly discovered goods creates a positive  price 
cost mark-up equal to 1λ −  in each industry. This distortion does not result in 
misallocation of resources across industries because all industries in the economy are 
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symmetric by assumption, but creates an incentive for over investment in R&D and 
excessive market-driven growth:  Each innovation contributes to social welfare by 
raising the instantaneous utility by an increment equal to lnλ  which is strictly less 
than the price cost mark-up 1λ − , which serves as the market incentive for firms 
engaged in R&D. In addition, firms discount profits by a  discount factor equal to  the 
market interest rate plus the probability of default due to further innovation, Iρ +  
because their lives are finite (due to creative destruction effect); whereas the social 
planner discounts the contribution of each innovation using the equilibrium market 
interest rate ρ . This difference in the market and socially optimal discount factors 
creates an intertemporal distortion which generates a tendency for underinvestment in 
R&D by profit-maximizing finite-lived firms. As a result one cannot rank the 
socially-optimum and the market-equilibrium rates of long-run innovation and growth 
in this global economy. 
 Since long-run growth is endogenous, we are interested in parameter changes that 
accelerate long-run economic growth and reduce the level of economic welfare in this 
global Schumpeterian expanding economy. In order to illustrate the role of economic 
distortions  and generate immiserizing endogenous growth, denote with 
( , , , )Lθ α λ ρ∈  a typical parameter that affects long-run growth and  obtain the 
following standard decomposition of discounted welfare: 
 
  1 1 1
ln )
dU U U dg U dg
d g d L g dθ θ θ θ ρ ρ α λ
⎡∂ ∂ ∂= + = + −⎢∂ ∂ ∂ −⎣ ⎦ θ
⎤⎥  (1.9) 
Immiserizing growth can arise from parameter changes that accelerate the rate of 
long-run endogenous economic growth (i.e., an increase in the productivity of R&D 
α , the economy’s labor endowment L, or the magnitude of innovations λ ) but 
reduce the discounted welfare (i.e., / 0dU dθ < ).  
 Consider first the case in which there is a corrective domestic policy (in the 
present model this policy can take the form of an R&D tax or subsidy) which 
achieves the socially optimum level of economic growth. This means that the term in 
square brackets of  (1.9) is equal to zero, and therefore /dU d U /θ θ= ∂ ∂ .  It is 
obvious, then, from inspection of (1.5) and (1.7) that a marginal increase in α , L, or 
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λ  raises the levels of long-run growth and welfare: In the presence of a corrective 
licy, the possibility of immiserizing growth does not arise. This result is consisten
with the theory of distortions and welfare.  
In the absence of a corrective policy, on
po t 
e could demonstrate readily the possibility 
of immiserizing growth. A necessary condition for this possibilty is that the market 
rate must exceed the socially optimum level of long-run growth, which implies that 
the term in square brackets in (1.9) is negative.   Because an increase in any of these 
parameters increases both the discounted value of welfare for any given level of 
growth and the level of long-run growth ( i.e., / 0U θ∂ ∂ >  and / 0g θ∂ ∂ >  for  
( , , )Lθ α λ∈ ) the sign of (1.9) is ambiguous.  H the m  the 
 ( / )( / )U g dg d
owever, if agnitude of
negative term θ∂ ∂  is sufficiently large, that is larger in absolute v
than the positiv r growth is associated with lower welfare: An 
increase in the economy’s labor endowment L, the magnitude of innovations 
alue 
e term, then highe
λ , or 
the productivity of R&D services α , raises the level of long-run Schumpeterian 
growth but reduces the level of discounted welfare. The intuition for this seeming
paradoxical result comes from the theory of welfare and distortions: In the presence 
of distortions and increase in the productive capacity of this global economy increase
the difference between the market and socially optimal rates of innovation and long-
run growth. This affects negatively the level of welfare and can dominate the direct 
welfare enhancing effect of these capacity-augmenting parameter changes. Therefore
even when the presence of economic distortions generates endogenous long-run 
growth, the main insights of immeserizing-growth theory apply with equal clarity












nalytical framework. This discovery set up the stage for the development of 
the theory of distortions and welfare which constitutes the backbone of the modern 
theory of commercial policy.  The insights of the latter as well as the possibility of 
immiserizing growth apply to formal neoclassical or endogenous growth dynamic 
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settings. In the absence of distortions, an expansion in an economy’s productive 
capacity enhances growth and dynamic efficiency; however the presence of 
distortions might create the conditions for a negative correlation between lon
economic growth and welfare. Using the theory of distortions to identify  policies th
affect the level of long-run growth and welfare and prevent the possibility of 
immeserizing growth is an important and relatively unexplored area in the new
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